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Watching out for “governance”: the 
nature and future of an illusion1
Grahame Lock
Something of  immense political significance is happening in the world. As far as I can 
make out, this development has – with a few extraordinary and praiseworthy exceptions – 
hardly been understood and treated in its true and full import.
The phenomenon in question is the spread not just of  the idea but of  the practice of  so-
called “governance” – corporate governance, urban governance, European governance, world 
governance e tutti quanti. This spread of  this “governance way” is what some commentators 
call the “end of  democracy”. Not an insignificant occurrence.
Governance is of  course a term of  art, without a reliable scientific basis. It is indeed often 
ridiculed, as an academic concept, by serious administrative scientists. But it is precisely its 
“conceptual  flexibility”  (see  below)  that  provides  it  with  potentially  destructive  political, 
economic and social power. We might say, together with some commentators, that governance 
is an illusion. That is perhaps true: it is not what it seems to be. Indeed, it has its illusionists, 
whose interest and skill is to “make us believe it”. But it is an immensely effective illusion, one 
component in a massively influential trend in the mutation of  Western life.
By far the best and most important study of  the phenomenon, among those which I have 
been able to track down, is the essay by John Brown, “De la gouvernance ou la constitution 
politique  du  néo-liberalisme”.2 It  is  symptomatic  of  the  contemporary  situation  in  the 
academic and political world that this essay was, as I understand – the author’s name is a 
pseudonym – not the work of  an academic political scientist, and in any case did not appear in 
an  academic  journal.  The  scientific  journals,  indeed,  though  they  publish  countless 
contributions on the most diverse aspects of  what is modishly called “governance”, contain 
little that succeeds in grasping the essence of  the trend which this term at one and the same 
time reveals and conceals. One might go so far as to interpret this situation as a warning sign 
of  the  bankruptcy  of  a  central  sector  of  professional  political  science,  especially  in  the 
English-speaking world, that can no longer see the wood for the trees.
Let us therefore turn to the literature which, in spite of  its apparently marginal status, leads 
us quickly to the heart of  the problem. Because the relevant texts are often in French, and not 
available in English translation, I shall devote a considerable part of  the present article to 
presenting their key ideas, with extensive quotations, as an inventory of  positions. I use the 
broadest of  brushes: the details of  any phenomenon are of  course of  great importance; but 
the problem in this case is getting a clear view of  the meaning of  the process as a whole.
Plunging in at the deep end, let me begin with a quote from Brown’s critique:
“Often, when considering the phenomenon of  governance, commentators see in it  no 
more than a simple change of  style in the way in which things are governed, without any 
fundamental political modification being involved. Governance is supposed to improve the 
efficiency of  the State while flexibilizing social and economic life. It is even claimed … to be 
capable of  ‘democratizing democracy’, by releasing this system from the weight of  the welfare 
State and bring it closer to ‘civil society’. Yet a simple examination of  the explicit objectives [of 
those promoting the governance project] reveals a fundamental incompatibility with the basic 
concepts  and institutions  of  democracy.  Popular  sovereignty,  the  principle  of  legality,  the 
1     Published in Episteme, Revista de Epistemologia e Historia das Ciencias e das Tecnicas, ano VI, 
nos. 15–16–17, 2006.
2 This  piece,  which  was  originally  published  in  French,  was  made  available  at 
attac.org/fra/list/doc/brown.htm, and in German, Spanish and other translations.
separation of  powers, the very idea of  law, the distinction between public and private – all 
these things are abandoned as obsolete notions.  The change in political  model ever more 
overtly implied by the governance idea has all the characteristics of  a real constitutive process, 
whose goal is to provide a political and legal sanction for the economic and social realities 
already deliberately brought into being by thirty years of  neo-liberalism.”3
A fundamental  modification  has  occurred,  then,  in  political  structures  and in political 
behaviour, all  over the (western and westernizing) world – but a modification already long 
contained in germ in the capitalist social formation, as well as in consequent versions of  liberal 
ideology.
Jean-Gustave Padioleau, in an assault on the “halfwits of  governance”,4 offers a partial list 
of  other  concepts  associated  with  and  exploited  by  the  governance  idea:  for  instance 
“complexity”,  “flexibility”,  “regulation”  (and  of  course  “deregulation”),  “project”, 
“partnership”,  “coordination”,  “negotiation”,  “contract”,  “private-public”,  and  so  on. 
Whenever one comes across a mix of  these and similar terms, one knows that the dogma of 
our age, the dogma of  governance, is at its disturbing work.
Padioleau adds: in such a system “the regime of  the opinion polls is sovereign. Thus the 
continuous supervision of  public action is guaranteed by consumer ‘focus groups’ put together 
by communication experts. As circumstances and contracts demand, private bureaus raise or 
lower  the  momentary  barometric  pressure  of  audits  and  evaluations.  Governance  is  a 
manipulation of  a market of  ‘forums’ and gullible individuals, held under expert control in the 
spider’s web.”5
Similarly, Bernard Cassen remarks that “there are terms which insinuate themselves into 
the political lexicon without anyone paying much attention… It is only when they are more or 
less established in the landscape that they reveal themselves for what they were from the very 
first moment: not just words, but ideas structuring a whole ideological edifice. This is how it is 
in the case of  two apparently all-embracing terms, much used by the media: ‘civil society’ and 
‘governance’.”6
And indeed, the governance project relies especially on its exploitation of  a – modified – 
concept of  “civil society”. I quote Brown again:
“The magic word which, at the same time as it blurs the lines of  distinction between public 
and private, gives an impression of  a ‘deepening of  democracy’, while in fact doing away with 
the very principle of  the sovereignty of  the people, is that of  ‘civil society’. This is a ‘learned’ 
phrase of  philosophical origin: in Hegel’s works it means the sphere in which private interests 
are represented, in opposition to those of  the State, which itself  represents Universality. Hegel 
writes: ‘In civil society, each individual is his own end, and all else means nothing to him. But 
he cannot accomplish the full extent of  his ends without reference to others; these others are 
therefore means to the end of  the particular person.’7 But as the term is used in the lingua 
franca of  governance, civil society is rather an intermediate reality between private associations 
3 Cf. Massimo De Angelis: “Governance, far from representing a paradigm shift away from neoliberal 
practices, has been shown to be a central element of  the neoliberal discourse in a particular phase of 
it, when neoliberalism and capital in general face particular problems of  accumulation, growing social 
conflict and a crisis of  reproduction. Governance sets itself  the task [of  tackling] these problems for 
capital by relaying the disciplinary role of  the market through the establishment of  a ‘continuity of 
powers’, based on normalised market values as the truly universal values. Governance thus seeks to 
embed these values in the many ways [in which] the vast arrays of  social and environmental problems 
are  addressed.”  De  Angelis,  “Neoliberal  Governance,  Reproduction  and  Accumulation”,  in  The 
Commoner, Spring-Summer 2003.
4 “Les gogos de la gouvernance”, in Libération, “Rebonds”, Paris, 1 June 2000.
5 See “Corégulation et gouvernance politique”, par Arno, at http://uzine.net/article856.html.
6 Cassen, “Le piège de la gouvernance”, in Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2001.
7 Hegel, Philosophy of  Right, § 182.
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with public interest functions (NGOs, religious or lay charitable associations and the like) and 
the market. Thus the idealism of  voluntary work and the lure of  profit are linked together to 
provide an ‘efficacious’ replacement for the functions of  social citizenship abandoned by the 
neo-liberal  State.”  Civil  society,  Brown  adds,  “is  even  called  upon  to  share  the  tasks  of 
government with the public powers, and in particular to share the task of  legislation with 
parliament”. There are now fashionable “left-wing” versions of  this concept of  civil society, in 
which it is  formally distinguished from the market,  so that a tripartite system of  power is 
suggested: State–civil society–market.8 “But the essential point is that the term ‘civil society’ 
should preserve its precious ambiguity,  sometimes embracing the market (civil society thus 
being identified with the set of  socio-economic actors), sometimes excluding it, according to 
the convenience of  whatever power is doing the talking at a given moment.”9
8 There exists a project called “progressive governance”, promoted among others by ex-US President 
Bill Clinton.
9 Brown quotes,  in  this  connexion,  Tom Burns,  “The  evolution  of  parliaments  and societies  in 
Europe: challenges and prospects”, in European Journal of  Social Theory 2 (2), London, 1999. One 
might add many similar references: for instance, Anne Mette Kjaer: “The term ‘civil society’ normally 
refers to an intermediate associational realm between State and family populated by organizations 
which are separate from the State, enjoy autonomy in relation to the State and are formed voluntarily 
by members of  society to protect and advance their interests or values. Civil society lies in between 
the  State  and  the  private  sphere.”  Kjaer  adds  that  it  may  be  understood to  “exclude  economic 
activities”. In the case of  the first definition the author makes reference to the work of  Gordon 
White;  in  respect  to  the  additional  definitional  characteristic,  to  that  of  Larry  Diamond  (Kjaer, 
Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, pp. 158-60). Charles Hauss notes: “For some observers, 
[civil  society]  only  includes  political  activity  engaged  in  through nonprofit  organizations  such as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At the other end of  the spectrum, some observers include 
all forms of  voluntary participation, whether in the public or private sector, political or apolitical” 
(Hauss,  “Civil  Society”,  at  http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/civil_society.jsp).  There  is  little 
point  in adding definitions  by more authors,  which would merely  add to the confusion:  what  is 
striking in this respect is not just the variety of  accounts on offer,  but the common lack of  any 
serious interest in disambiguation. Or, to put the point in another way, what is frightening is the 
poverty of  the philosophical or theoretical basis of  the analyses proposed by most researchers: Hegel, 
whatever may be said about his style, is by contrast with today’s authors a model of  rigour and of 
clarity.
But ambiguity can play a political  role.  Cf.  Thierry Brugvin, “Societé civile,  mouvements 
sociaux et  regulation internationale  du travail”,  colloque “Les  mobilisations  altermondialistes”,  at 
http://www.afsp.msh-paris.fr/activite/groupe/germm/collgermm03txt/germm03brugvin.pdf, 
section on “Les ambiguités du concept de société civile au plan politique”. See also Charles Ségalen, 
“‘L’Insécurité sociale’ – A propos de l’ouvrage de Robert Castel”, in  Oasis Magazine,  5 September 
2004: “Ours is the epoch of  governance….  [Such a term involves] a semantic slippage borrowed 
from magical thinking: the confusion – Jean Lebrun says a kind of  incest – between word and thing 
… The use of  the term ‘governance’, without it being defined and without an explanation of  what it 
is being used to say or fail to say, can serve a particular ideological current …”
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The rise of  a “new” version of  the concept of  civil  society,10 jointly with a dogma of 
governance, is no accidental event, but can be explained in terms of  definite and even obvious 
advantages – to certain powers.
“When political scientists and students of  public administration speak about governance 
instead of  governing … they refer  specifically to a  conscious and a long-standing change 
tendency that is going on in many developed countries”, writes Seppo Tiihonen in an anodyne 
study of  the concept.11 Where governing “refers to constituted policies of  state actors backed 
by  formal  authority  to  use  monopolized  coercive  powers,  governance  suggests  [rather] 
activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formal authority.” 
Tiihonen’s story of  the emergence of  the present-day notion of  governance is typical of  the 
abstract  and non-committal  accounts  commonly related by the academic specialists:  “New 
governance principles have been developed”, the author informs us, “because many of  the 
former, old up-down governing practices have lost their lure and capability to meet future 
challenges”.12
Compare Cassen, the non-academic, who is more specific: the recent re-emergence of  the 
concept of  governance, he writes, was initiated in the 1980s by the World Bank, then taken up 
by other agencies like the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). In this context, it became institutionalized as a normative notion, that of 
“good governance” – the disciplined application,  as  Brown puts  it,  “of  the old  plans  for 
structural economic adjustment, now radicalized and, in Orwellian language, called ‘strategies 
for the reduction of  poverty’”. The “civil society actors” involved in the imposition on Third 
World States of  such dictates of  “good governance” – whereby a failure to fulfil the imposed 
10 Cf. Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty, “Civil Society and Governance – A Research Study in 
India”,  Draft  Synthesis  Report,  June  2000,  at  www.pria.org,  who  provide  a  “neutral”  list  of 
significations:
“In the contemporary interpretations of  civil society … three distinctive approaches can be 
noted.
The first approach is essentially derived from the Anglo-American tradition and builds on the 
work  of  Tocqueville.  In  this  approach,  civil  society  is  seen  as  an  intermediary  layer  between 
individuals  and families,  on the one hand,  and state institutions,  on the other.  Even where state 
institutions evolved within a democratic polity, they begin to dominate different aspects of  human 
endeavour – health, education, social services and a wide variety of  arenas where citizens interact with 
the state. The representative form of  democracy creates a distance between state, institutions and 
their decision making from individuals and families who are relatively powerless. Building solidarity 
and associations across citizens helps them to mediate and negotiate their aspirations and interests 
with the state. In this formulation, civil society becomes an arena for expression of  common interests 
of  citizens and for empowering them to collectively articulate them vis-à-vis state institutions.
The  second meaning of  civil  society has  arisen from the  challenge posed by  citizens  to 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As citizens began to protest against authoritarian states in 
Eastern  Europe  and  former  Soviet  Union,  on  the  one  hand,  and  military  dictatorship  in  Latin 
America,  Philippines  and  South  Africa,  on  the  other,  these  movements  began  to  represent  the 
aspirations of  collective forces of  individuals. The thrust of  these movements was to democratise the 
state and create fundamental freedoms and liberties for their citizens. In such a formulation, civil 
society began to be equated with the process of  democratisation in political structures and systems.
A  third approach  to  the  notion  of  civil  society  has  its  roots  in  the  growing  universal 
acceptance of  free market and private enterprise as engines of  economic development. As questions 
about the role of  the state in economic development began to be raised, there evolved a growing 
demand for liberating economic activities from the clutches of  state hegemony. In this formulation, 
non-state actors included for-profit private enterprises, just as it included not-for-profit civil society 
actions.”
11 From Governing to Governance: A Process of  Change, Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2004, 
p. 21.
12 Op. cit., p. 22.
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criteria normally results in economic or other forms of  punishment – are, Brown notes, often 
NGOs. These, while attempting to palliate the most destructive effects of  the system, in reality 
thereby transform themselves into its pillars.  But the same set of  actors also includes the 
private companies who make their profits in the field of  “humanitarian” business. At the world 
level,  that  is  to say,  at  the level  of  so-called “global  governance”,  the coordinating actors 
include (once again) the IMF, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum and the institutions 
of  the  European  Union  (to  which  we  shall  return),  as  well  as  “the  great  transnational 
enterprises,  transformed”  –  precisely  by  the  global  governance  system  –  “into  powerful 
political actors capable of  imposing their collective will on the nation States, via the world 
economic-financial organisms [which link these actors], or even of  imposing their individual 
wills, as in the case of  Monsanto, which succeeded in forcing the Brazilian government to 
accept the massive introduction of  transgenic cultures.”
The kind of  State structure demanded by the good governance ideology is, it is suggested, 
one in which the mission of  public administration is no longer to serve society as a whole, but 
rather to furnish goods and services to particular sectors and to client-consumers, even when 
this policy aggravates the inequalities between citizens or between regions of  a given country.13 
“Good governance”, for Cassen, simply means “the Washington Consensus”.
Alan  Scott  has  usefully  summarized14 some  central  and  paradoxical  aspects  of  the 
(deliberately) blurry category of  governance, as applied not only in academic circles but, as we 
saw, in economic, social and political life.
For instance, given the various planes (from global to local) at which governance operates, 
reference  is  often  made  to  a  so-called  system  of  “multi-level  governance”  (sometimes 
abbreviated to MLG). Kjaer writes that “MLG refers to an evolving policy mode in the EU, in 
which  the  state  no  longer  monopolizes  EU policy-making… MLG is  a  model  in  which 
decision-making  competencies  are  shared.  The  Commission  devises  programmes  in 
partnership with local and regional authorities. Individual State executives lose a significant 
degree of  control over rule enforcement… The regions act increasingly at the EU level … and 
so on”. In other words, more generally “the study of  MLG involves examining the relationship 
between sub-national, national and supra-national actors without an a priori assumption that 
states are the dominant actors…”15 Scott puts the matter more simply: “multi-level governance 
is EU mood music”.
Paradoxically, he adds, multi-level governance became a popular policy term at a time of 
increased centralization; in fact, at the beginning of  the era of  post-democracy.
This latter concept is taken up and developed by, among others, Colin Crouch.16
13 Ali Kazancigil, Director of  the Social Science Research Division of  UNESCO, “Gouvernance et 
science: modes de gestion de la société et de production du savoir empruntés au marché”, in Revue 
internationale des sciences sociales, Paris: Unesco, no. 155, March 1998; quoted by Cassen, op. cit.
14 Scott, at http://wuv.uibk.ac.at/pdf/Governance.pdf.
15 Kjaer, op. cit., p. 109.
16 Crouch,  Postdemocracy,  Oxford:  Polity  Press,  2004.  Crouch explains:  “What  I  meant  by post 
democracy  was  a  society  in  which all  the  institutions  that  we associated with democracy remain 
beautifully in place … but where somehow … the heart of  it comes out because the forces within the 
society that make democracy work … weaken. I’m actually talking about … the weakening of  the 
ability of  middle and low socioeconomic groups to develop their own political  agendas.  It’s that 
decline in the autonomy of  lower socioeconomic groups to define autonomously through their own 
institutions a political agenda and the passing of  that agenda to the control of  professionals in parties 
and think tanks and associated with that, the shift of  power out of  the whole system towards private 
concentrations  of  global  wealth,  … that’s  post  democracy.”  (POWER  Inquiry  Witness  Session, 
Manchester, 28 April 2005.) Cf. the differently inspired critique by the American John Fonte: “The 
governmental structure of  the EU is post-democratic.  Power in the EU principally resides in the 
European Commission (EC) and to a lesser extent the European Court of  Justice (ECJ). The EC is 
… unelected and, for the most part, unaccountable. A White Paper issued by the EC suggests that 
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The four pillars of  post-democracy, on Scott’s  account, are (1) the “disembedding” of 
political elites; (2) the trivialization of  politics; (3) rule via the “cadastral map”; and (4) the 
breakdown of  institutional “pillarization”.
By the disembedding of  political elites, Scott means the tendential freeing of  those elites 
from control  by  the  mass  of  citizens,  who come to play  (in  Crouch’s  words)  a  “passive, 
quiescent, even apathetic part”, as well as an ever tighter control by the political class over the 
citizens, via a strengthening of  State security and secrecy.
The trivialization of  politics involves a “subordination of  politics to organization” as well 
as a “reduction of  the science of  politics to the science of  administration”.17 Thus politics is 
reduced to “management”, with a consequent marginalization of  the power of  parliaments and 
even of  executives, accompanied by an increased “personalization” of  whatever remains of 
political  life.  “Public  opinion”  becomes  a  key  domain  of  measurement  but  also  of 
manipulation; and such manipulation by the mass media (the politics of  “image” and “spin”) 
becomes a crucial instrument in this connexion.
Rule via the “cadastral map” involves a system of  “rituals of  verification”, especially via 
dogmas of  target-setting (organizational “goals”, “mission statements” and the like) as well as 
procedures  of  evaluation,  auditing,  accreditation  and  so  on  (all  of  which,  in  spite  of 
appearances  and  Public  Relations  claims,  are  essentially  artificial,  at  a  great  bureaucratic 
distance from reality).18 Thus all public bodies, and even political parties and governments, 
come to adopt the terminology and methods of  managerialism, which are derived from the 
business sector. This point can easily be verified by listening to or reading almost any statement 
by a government minister or political leader of  our day: their  langue de bois – that is, their 
choice and mix of  clichés – will immediately reveal their language to have been infected by the 
managerialist virus.
Finally,  the  breakdown  of  institutional  “pillarization” signifies  the  “increasing 
homogenization of  styles of  institutional governance”, as well as an ever-growing permeability 
of  the line between State (public sphere) and market (private sphere), which means in effect an 
opening of  the State to corporate interests, itself  resulting in growing corruption within the 
public sector. This public sector generally (health, education, public services) is restructured on 
the “business model”, leading on the way to a loss of  public service spirit. Meanwhile, political 
party programmes “converge”, leading to a “vapid” politics.
Taking account of  all the above, Scott concludes, again in the line of  Crouch’s argument, 
that post-democracy does not so much destroy the institutions of  representative democracy, as 
render them increasingly irrelevant. In fact, post-democracy resembles pre-democratic epochs: 
“public display of  wealth and power, increased social polarization etc.” – while running parallel 
to formally still existent democratic institutions. He adds that the paradigmatic actor in post-
democratic  society is  the “phantom firm”,19 located “in the financial  sector,  where money 
moves fastest”, or “outsourcing manufacture to enable rapid shifts of  production”; and whose 
this is one of  the reasons for its success: ‘The original and essential source of  European integration is 
that  the  EU’s  executive  body,  the  Commission,  is  supranational  and  independent  from national, 
sectoral,  or  other  influences.’”  Fonte,  “The  Fracturing  of  the  West?”,  at 
http://www.cis.org.au/Policy/Spring02/polspring02-3.htm.
17 An  old  dream of  nearly  every  political  class  and  of  many  political  movements,  with  diverse 
anticipations in the history of  political theory, both on the left and on the right of  the spectrum.
18 Weirdly, the concept of  governance began its career with the 1937 article of  the economist Ronald 
Coase,  entitled  “The  Nature  of  the  Firm”,  one  of  Coase’s  principal  concerns  being  to effect  a 
reduction in firms’ internal transaction costs. Nowadays, in complete contrast, one of  the main causes 
of  the strangulation of  the public sphere lies precisely in the geometric growth of  such transaction 
costs, consequent on the adoption (on the basis of  the governance and “accountability” dogmas) of 
hyper-bureaucratic auditing, evaluation and accreditation costs and the like, resulting in an astronomic 
waste  of  public  funds  (many  of  which  sums  naturally  find  their  way  into  the  pockets  of  the 
commercial or semi-privatized auditing and consultancy sector).
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public  identity  is  mediated via  the “brand image”.  “Designer economics” meets  “designer 
politics”.
At each level,  then – that of  corporate governance, of  urban governance, of  national 
governance, of  European governance or of  global governance – the term “governance” refers 
to (new) forms of  managing public affairs in which an appeal is made to the intervention of 
“civil society”, with a parallel reduction in the role of  properly political institutions. The goal 
may in fact be a cutback of  the role of  the public sphere to that of  the minimal State dear to 
the most doctrinaire liberal ideology. Indeed, according to Brown, “ideally governance should 
result in the disappearance of  the State as the instance determining the public interest and to 
the  substitution  of  the  existing  legal  norms  by  so-called  flexible  forms  of  regulation  … 
‘Governing  without  government’…”  Only  a  paradox  comparable  with  those  found  in 
mysticism or in negative theology20 can, he adds, express the true essence of  the governance 
concept. “As the ineffable Commissioner [Pascal] Lamy put it: ‘The notion of  governance is 
luckily, it seems to me, a concept solid enough to crystallize thought yet flexible enough to 
facilitate a convergence of  views. It is rather like the clutch of  a car: it is indispensable and yet 
it comes in several versions.’”21
Now all this talk about governance, Brown properly notes, has a kind of  youthful and 
libertarian air. The impression made is supposed to be that the substitution of  the democratic 
State by a domain of  “participatory” contractual transactions implies a greater “liberty” and a 
greater “capacity for initiative” for everyone. The problem, however, “is that this conception 
of  liberty which liberalism wants to instil in us is enormously naïve. Liberty is presented as the 
primary datum of  an idyllic state of  affairs, while the State is regarded as an obstacle to the full 
enjoyment of  this liberty. What our new ‘libertarians’ of  governance fail to take account of  is 
the fact that the democratic State, which derives its legitimacy from the existence of  a public 
space in which the citizens are equal in respect of  their rights, is at least for the moment the 
only guarantee of  the equality between citizens. Every other level and, more particularly, the 
level  of  civil society or that of  the business enterprise,  is  a space of  inequality or of  the 
domination of  some persons by others.”
It is odd that this simple but all-important point has not generally been grasped by political 
theorists.  If  governance  is  indeed,  as  I  have  argued  elsewhere,  a  sort  of  continuous, 
incremental policy-making and policy-implementing process bringing all kinds of  public, semi-
public  and  private  organisations  and  bodies  together  in  endlessly  repeated  cycles  of 
negotiation, then it is obvious – it is no more than the application of  an elementary social law 
– that the more powerful actors in these endless rounds of  governance negotiation will come 
out on top. And the term “powerful” here means “economically powerful” as well as “political 
powerful”. Or, to put it another way: whereas the old and supposedly obsolescent system of 
representative democracy, in which the State was at least in principle an expression of  the 
sovereignty of  the people,  might at  least  pose a challenge to the power of  the economic 
oligarchies,  in  the  new,  libertarian  and  flexible  governance  structures  these  economic 
oligarchies  are  in effect  already inside  the  policy-making system itself.  And since  the  line 
between policy-making and legislation is also becoming blurred, the economic oligarchies are 
now even able to co-legislate, without fear that “politics” will intervene against them from the 
outside – except of  course in the case of  a politics of  an anti-system variety, one which will 
19 Of  which Enron is a famous example. See Crouch, op. cit.; also Phil Burton-Cartledge, “Post-
Democracy “, in The Sociological Review, Volume 53, May 2005. 
20 The “via negativa” or apophatic account of  God, as found for example in  Pseudo Dionysius or 
Maimonides’  Guide for the Perplexed,  where “contradiction and paradox are the  birthright of  a 
Deity”.
21 Speech by Pascal Lamy, sometime European Commissioner for Trade: “Good governance in the 
public and private sectors against the background of  globalisation”, Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, Brussels, 30 January 2001; quoted by Brown, op. cit.
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however probably in future be regarded as “unconstitutional” and indeed as bordering on the 
“illegal”. So much for democracy.
European Governance
The European Union, as has often been pointed out, is an uncontested world leader in the 
promotion  of  international  governance  structures.  In  2001  the  European  Commission 
published its  White Paper on European Governance, inspired by the then President of  the 
Commission, Romano Prodi. The White Paper was “drafted by a ‘Governance Team’ within 
the Commission [so not by any elected, representative body or bodies – G.L.], which in turn 
consulted widely among academics as well as government experts and civil society”.22 Led by 
Jérôme Vignon, “the team’s mission was to improve the effectiveness of  the EU and develop 
strategies to improve its communication and engagement with the wider European public(s). 
The key concept of  ‘governance’ seemed to draw these two elements together. Rather than 
focussing on traditional authoritative ‘governmental’  modes of  operation, ‘governance’  was 
used by the White Paper team to suggest that a wider range of  policy instruments and modes 
should be deployed, including many which engaged those ‘regulated’ in the determination and 
operation of  modes of  regulation.”23
It all sounds like a fairly innocent project, indeed a well-intentioned one.24 What, one might 
wonder, could be objected to in such an attempt to improve “effectiveness”, “engagement” 
and “communication”? Indeed, the White Paper was presented to the European public in even 
rosier terms: “the Commission adopted its White Paper on European Governance in July 2001 
with the aim of  establishing more democratic  forms of  governance at  all  levels  –  global, 
European,  national,  regional  and  local”,  while  aiming  at  “better  involvement”,  “better 
regulation”, and even at making a contribution to promoting “world governance”.
The themes of  democratization and “world governance” are in fact to be found in the 
contributions of  Romani Prodi himself. I quote from his speech of  31 March 2000 at the 
Second  COMECE  (Commissio  Episcopatuum  Communitatis  Europensis)  Congress  in 
Brussels: 
“The world we live in”, Prodi notes, “is changing fast. The emergence of  a single global 
economy is making individual countries ever more interdependent and national boundaries 
increasingly irrelevant. At the same time, the IT revolution is turning our world into a global 
digital  village,  and international  trade is  growing exponentially,  almost  doubling in volume 
every decade. Yet the very forces which are uniting the planet threaten to deepen the divide 
between rich and poor countries, between the haves and the have-nots in our societies….
[But] we need globalization that promotes social equity and works to everyone’s advantage, 
including the poorest nations on earth. 
22 Mark A. Pollack, “The Commission White Paper and European Governance”, in EUSA Review, 
Fall 2001.
23 Daniel  Wincott,  “The White  Paper,  the  Commission  and  the  ‘Future  of  Europe’”,  in  EUSA 
Review, Fall 2001.
24 Cf. Erik Oddvar Eriksen, “Democratic or technocratic governance?”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
no. 6/01: “The proposals outlined in the White Paper for change in the EU are also an example of 
what,  in  analytical  terms,  political  scientists  call  governance.  This  is  not  political  rule  through 
responsible institutions such as parliament and bureaucracy – which amounts to government – but 
innovative practices of  networks or  horizontal  forms of  interaction… This is  much in line with 
recent scholarship in its efforts to conceptualise the EU. The EU is conceived as a system of  multi-
level  governance  which  consists  of  multi-tiered,  geographically  overlapping  structures  of 
governmental and non-governmental élites. Some analysts term this the new governance agenda…”
8
We  therefore  need  to  devise  some  democratically  accountable  way  of  handling 
globalization, a new kind of  global governance to manage the global economy. Business is 
going transnational: so must politics. 
A strong multilateral system of  global  governance [my emphasis:  G.L.]  is  essential  for 
preventing  or peacefully  resolving the  global  conflicts  that  could easily  arise  from climate 
change, migration, nuclear proliferation, resource scarcity and other global issues.”
Prodi asks: “What form should such governance take? .… I think that any such system 
must involve three key elements: 
• Strong institutions based on shared values; 
• Co-operation between increasingly integrated regions of  the world; and
• Democratic accountability.”
Again,  a  combination,  one  might  think,  of  good  intentions  and  innocuous  clichés.  For 
instance, Prodi lays special emphasis on the “democratic” aspects of  his project, especially on 
this notion of  “democratic accountability”. That sounds attractive. But this very phrase is in 
fact a good example of  the way the illusion is sold. Whereas the term “democratic” has a long, 
controversial  and still  proud history,  “accountability” is  drawn from business audit  jargon. 
Bruce Charlton explains: “Accountability is assumed to be an intrinsically desirable goal… Yet 
accountability is a slippery rhetorical term with two largely distinct meanings: a sharply-defined 
technical managerial meaning, and a looser, more general or ‘popular’ meaning. This opens the 
way for accountability to be used in a rhetorically manipulative fashion – by shifting back and 
forth between technical and general meanings… Accountability in its technical sense carries 
almost the opposite meaning to those democratic, egalitarian, radical and ‘empowering’ values 
that are associated with the term in general usage… Behaviour is labelled as unaccountable 
(hence unacceptable) simply because it is not subject to managerial control, and this is taken 
(by managers and politicians who wish to control this behavior) to imply a need to introduce 
audit systems… As with accountability, the effectiveness of  this form of  managerial discourse 
depends upon the rhetorical device of  switching between general and technical meanings of 
the word….”25
Prodi  remarks  that  “world  governance  like  European  governance  can  acquire  true 
legitimacy only if  the citizens are involved in policy-making and decision-making”. Of  course, 
we already saw that the governance project  is  not – as he suggests  – characterized by its 
involvement  of  citizens  in  decision-making,  but  rather  by  its  replacement  of  the  active 
citizenry  as  a  category  by  that  of  civil  society;  and  within  civil  society,  by  that  of  the 
25 Charlton, “Audit, accountability, quality and all that: The growth of  managerial technologies in UK 
Universities”, in (ed.) Stephen Prickett and Patricia Erskine-Hill, Education! Education! Education! –  
Managerial ethics and the law of  unintended consequences, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2002. I do not 
know how Mr Prodi himself  understood his slogan. But it is how such dicta work that counts.
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(managerialist) concept of  the stakeholder.26 Towards the end of  his speech, Prodi reveals at 
least some of  his cards:
“The challenge of  democratic  accountability”,  he concludes,  “faces Europe too, as we 
enter  the  new  millennium.  It  is  clear  that  representative  democracy  and  the  European 
institutional  system as it  has existed over the last  half  century are no longer meeting the  
aspirations of  our citizens. They want  a much more participatory democracy, one that gives 
them a real say in shaping their future.”
The  message  could  hardly  be  clearer:  the  “old”  way,  the  way  of  “representative 
democracy”, is no longer valid. It is to be replaced by a new, “much more participatory system” 
– the governance way.
Brown comments: in the proposals made in the White Paper, “the people, understood as 
the whole body of  the citizens, is the absent figure. The great paradox of  governance is that it  
claims to extend democracy to civil society; yet the latter is precisely that set of  relations in  
which the individuals are not citizens, but simple vectors of  private interests [my emphasis: 
G.L.]. One is only a citizen in so far as one is a member of  the sovereign people. The placing 
of  the law, as an expression of  the will of  the sovereign people, above private interest, is the 
only instrument which the citizens possess against inequality and against the domination of  the 
weaker by the stronger. Thus the apparent ‘devolution’ of  powers to civil society which the 
neo-liberal governance system is bringing about means depriving the people of  its sovereignty. 
In fact, what is being carried through is a coup d’état, for the moment of  a bloodless kind.”27
The post-democratic era
Why is all this happening now?
Anything like a full historical account would of  course be an immensely complex one. But 
it is clear that the fall of  the Berlin Wall and the collapse of  Soviet Communism – a tragic 
series  of  events,  in the technical  and indeed in  the  classic  sense of  the  term – removed 
26 Cf. for instance Les Metcalfe, “More Green than Blue: Positioning the Governance White Paper”, 
EUSA Review, Fall 2001: “Granting the importance of  the five ‘principles’ of  good governance, they 
have not been crafted into a new model of  EU governance and specified in a detailed programme of 
reform. Individually, they are not precisely formulated. The first two, openness and participation, are 
not just proposals for change; they are also invitations to a wide range of  stakeholders [my emphasis: 
G.L.] to participate in defining the direction of  change. The principle of  accountability is equated 
with  clearer  definition  of  individual  institutional  responsibilities  and  does  not  really  address  the 
difficult problems of  designing frameworks of  accountability where there are shared responsibilities 
in multilevel systems of  governance. Presenting effectiveness as a principle avoids dealing with the 
thorny conceptual and practical problems of  determining what effectiveness criteria are applicable to 
governance networks. Moreover, relying on a limited management-by-objectives model carries the 
risk of  ignoring important dimensions of  effectiveness and creating rigidities that make adaptation to 
change costly and slow. Finally, the principle of  coherence is a watered-down version of  the earlier 
commitment to ‘radical decentralization’. Its vagueness is symptomatic of  the lack of  a model that 
explains  how new forms  of  governance  based  on  partnerships  and  horizontal  coordination  can 
manage interdependence in multilevel organizational networks.” All this – which is an internal critique 
of  the jargon of  the White Paper – means in effect that the debate is no longer about “democracy” at 
all, but about the application of  managerial (that is, originally private-sector) criteria to the public 
space of  European politics.
27 Massimo De Angelis mentions in connexion with the governance project “the production of  war 
and the management of  neo-liberal peace…. War here is not simply the product of  an army in the 
war theatre, but is the co-regulation of  different network of  actors, the army, the media, the NGOs, 
the charities. Often these actors have different interests and goals, yet the way they are organised into 
a whole constrains their choices. The way these actors are articulated, their governance, allow them to 
claim they all ‘do their job’, without being able to question the rules of  their functional integration in 
a broader mechanism.” Angelis, op. cit.
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practically all obstacles to the realization of  what we might call the “essence” of  the world 
capitalist (or if  you like the free market, liberal, now neo-liberal) system. The eyes of  many of 
us are regularly turned in the “wrong” direction – sometimes in the direction encouraged by 
the politician-conjurer – the illusionist. So most of  the European – and perhaps even of  the 
world – populations, casting their view on the crumbling communist regimes, failed to think 
much about what was coming next. They probably did not even concern themselves with the 
application of  the most elementary of  political laws. If  Lord Acton’s well-known warning is 
still salient – that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” – then it follows 
that a monopolar system based on any “value system” you care to name is bound to become a 
real threat.
The  ex-Soviet  dissident  Alexander  Zinoviev  writes  provocatively  in  this  connexion: 
“Humanity  has  entered the post-democratic  era.  Democracy  has completed its  task as  an 
instrument of  the western world in the struggle against the communist world during the Cold 
War period. Since the collapse of  the other superpower, the USSR, the planet has become 
‘single-State’ or ‘monopolar’. This means that democracy is now superfluous for the western 
world’s  leaders….  Previously,  at  the  time  of  the  Cold  War,  there  existed  a  world-scale 
democracy: in the world there was a cohabitation of  the forces of  Western democracy, the 
communist ‘East’ and the Third World. Within the Western world, democracy was embodied in 
the relations between the nation States as well as between the forces within each State. The 
struggle between parties influenced the policies of  the authorities in a public way…. Since the 
end of  the Cold War, whose result was the defeat of  the Soviet bloc, of  the USSR and of 
Soviet communism, we have witnessed a giddy fall of  democracy…”28
If  democracy has experienced such a giddy fall,  that  does not mean that  the peoples 
themselves  have  abandoned  it.  Rather,  the  post-democratic  scheme  has  to  be  actively 
“marketed” – the term is not inappropriate – in imaginative ways. But it is not just a question 
of  marketing:  it  is  also a question of  principles  of  efficient  organization of  the capitalist 
formation. The “governance way” seems to offer not only a marketing opportunity, but such 
practical principles too, perhaps even in their optimal version.29
In  1999  Jean-Marie  Guéhenno,  former  French Ambassador  to  the  Western  European 
Union, published his book entitled The End of  Democracy.30 Hauke Brunkhorst, referring to 
Guéhenno, writes of  organizations like the now hegemonic European Union or World Trade 
Organization  (etc.)  as  characterized  by  “long  chains  of  legitimacy”.  Thus  they  may  be 
considered, “if  we regard matters pessimistically, [as] post-democratic ... [They are] regimes of 
hegemonic law, ... [tending] to become – as Max Weber once suggested with reference to the 
German Imperial State (Kaiserreich) – a ‘system of  organized irresponsibility’”.31 Guéhenno’s 
point is that any democratic system presupposes and requires that the political authorities of 
that system can and will be held responsible for what they do or omit to do. But in a world in 
which power has shifted away from such states,  toward all kinds of  international forces – 
whether themselves “political”, like the European Union or United Nations – or economic 
forces etc. – such responsibility is ceasing in many cases to be a realistic assumption. In other 
words, global governance means not an extension of  democracy, but its tendential end. 
Governance, as we already saw, is a system of  “participation”. That, indeed, is its political 
“strength”. This is true at all levels, from the global to the local. It is from this state of  affairs 
that it draws what is called its “legitimacy”. But it is not a system of  equal participation. Far 
28 Zinoviev, “Une guerre contre l’Europe”, in Le Monde, Paris, 25 May 1999.
29 But maybe not entirely optimal in every respect. For instance, De Angelis argues (op. cit.) that “very 
few NGOs can sustain … close partnership relations with business and government without at the 
same time alienating the support of  social movements and thus their legitimacy”.
30 La Fin de la Démocratie, Paris: Flammarion, 1999.
31 “A  Polity  without  a  State?  European  Constitutionalism  between  Evolution  and  Revolution”, 
ARENA Working Paper 14/03. Of  course, there is also an “optimistic” viewpoint…
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from it!  Corinne Gobin speaks in this connexion of  a movement “from representation to 
participation”.32 The general philosophy inspiring the “European way” is that of  a triangular 
schema in which “civil society” is invoked in order to “complete” the system of  market and 
political power. In the type of  political system – for example, that now being promoted by the 
European Union – called governance, “the multitude of  associations presented as being on a 
footing of  equality (for the differences based on financial power or on the nature of  the links 
between representatives  and  the  represented  are  not  mentioned)  usurps  the  place  of  the 
people…. The sovereignty of  the people and the elective principle of  representation based on 
a mandate and on political responsibility are no longer recognized as being the foundation of 
the democratic edifice. The use of  the reference to ‘civil society’ allows the actions of  groups 
representing the interests of  various private powers, whether business, corporatist or religious 
powers,  to  be  legitimated,  while  the  general  interest  is  finally  marginalized  and  diluted. 
Democracy understood as  the representation of  the  people becomes a  democracy of  the 
representation of  ‘powers of  note’. ‘Participation’ becomes the key term of  this system: the 
new legitimacy of  political power is built on such an idea of  participation… This system of 
participation  is  situated  below  any  principle  of  the  separation  of  powers,  every  partner 
institution being in the last instance associated with the Executive, conceived as an immense 
network (the image of  governance again)…”33
Cassen calls the new system a “privatization of  politics”.34 Jacques Rancière calls it by the 
name of  “consensual post-democracy”.35 Henri Acselrad comments in this regard: “The end 
of  the military dictatorships and the worldwide democratizing wave of  the 1980s gave rise to 
strong expectations that there would be advances in the double process of  democratizing the 
State and socializing politics…. Today a very different paradigm has emerged…. Formerly 
political themes are de-politicized and moved to the private sphere. Government practices are 
transferred to non-State players through new channels, such as forums and councils that are 
considered exempt from the purportedly limited relevance and effectiveness of  politics. Private 
civil institutions are now supposed to express unity – once the prerogative of  the state political 
authority.  The values,  cultural  models  and rules  of  the social  game in  which interests  are 
defined, are now considered beyond doubt, and the various interests are symbolically united. 
Lastly, politics is translated into economics through metaphors like ‘entrepreneurial-city’ for 
urban policies, ‘entrepreneur-employee’ for the management of  public investment programs, 
‘competitiveness  of  the nation’  for the  country’s  international  strategies,  the  attribution of 
prices to non-mercantile elements of  the environment, the treatment of  the selling capacity of 
science as an expression of  the value of  the knowledge produced in the universities etc. So the 
model  that  Jacques  Rancière  called  ‘consensual  post-democracy’  is  becoming  increasingly 
visible, characterized by the concealment of  conflict, the ‘disappearance of  politics’ and the 
assignment of  particular social groups as appropriate for joining in negotiations with the State, 
having being assigned the new status of  ‘partners’. The councils and forums include bosses 
and workers, polluting agents and the polluted victims; yet these councils and their equivalents, 
hybrid figures between State and society, nevertheless treat each and all as possessed of  this 
homogeneous status of  ‘partners’….”36
In conclusion, Acselrad argues that the “consensual post-democracy” notion “suggests the 
corporation as a model for the organization of  society. The idea is that the logic of  efficiency, 
32 “De l’Union européenne à … l’européanisation des mouvements sociaux?”, in Revue de Politique 
internationale comparée, vol. 9, n° 1, Bruxelles, Printemps 2002, pp. 119-138.
33 Gobin, op. cit., p. 11.
34 Cassen, op. cit.
35 See for example Rancière, La Mésentente: politique et philosophie, Paris: Galilée, 1995.
36 “Globalization  and  the  public  sphere  –  consensual  post-democracy  or  revival  of  the  Polis?”; 
communication presented at the Development Policy Forum 2001 of  the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
Berlin, 29 June 2001 (English modified).
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measured by strictly monetary criteria, is from now on a guide to all aspects of  social life – 
from public administration to the management of  circulation of  genetic information.” But, he 
pertinently notes, “no process of  democratic construction could survive the shaping of  social 
life on the model of  the business hierarchy…”
This privatization of  the public sphere is not just a matter of  an (often ill-defined) number 
of  (usually very unequal) partners negotiating “according to the rules”. The rules too are “up 
for negotiation”, or if  you like, “up for grabs”. For just as in the case of  the Law Merchant of 
a past, pre-democratic age – the “bodies of  customs and law which grew up in the Middle 
Ages in Western Europe among merchants to regulate their relations with each other”37 – so in 
the case of  the new private law, operating on a global scale, what is important is not so much 
the statute law legislated by sovereign states, but the “arrangements” made between themselves 
by the big players. Pre-democracy, we might say, is thus renewed in the post-democratic age.
The secret of  all such governance arrangements, whether in respect of  procedure (rules) or 
content, is of  course no secret at all: it is contract, or the contractual metaphor.38 Some time 
ago I wrote: 
“We  are  concerned  …  with  the  present  fashion  in  political  thinking  for  ‘contractual 
governance’. The underlying ground of  contract is the ...  pacta sunt servanda principle: an 
entirely general principle, of  late-mediaeval origin in its elaborated form... “39
But, as we might expect in a world ever more dominated by the new, “flexible” governance 
principle, there is no new “planetary legal order”, the product of  a sovereign authority. Indeed, 
the undermining of  the diverse state sovereignties – though, for entirely obvious reasons, the 
sovereignty of  the United States is better safeguarded in this respect than that of  the European 
lands, let alone that of  the Third World states – is producing, I argued, “what might be called a 
kind of  ‘re-feudalization’ of  social and of  legal relations. There is, it appears, a ‘new type’ … 
of  contract, which plays a (more or less) novel political and legal role, offering the basis for an 
alternative to the older, hierarchical principle of  internal State sovereignty – though in varied 
and  hybrid  forms.  Indeed,  [Alain]  Supiot’s  conclusion40 is  that  ‘far  from  designating  the 
triumph of  contract over [State] law, the “contractualization of  society” is rather the symptom 
of  the hybridization of  law and of  contract’ itself  and, again, of  ‘the reactivation of  feudal-
type social bonds’.
What I want to suggest [I added] is that the present and planned configurations of  the 
European Union reflect  these developments....  Europe has been established – though not 
without resistance from various quarters – as a kind of  regulatory super-State. The result is 
sometimes  referred  to  as  a  new ‘governance’  structure,  as  for  instance  in  the  European 
Commission’s White Paper on European Governance.... The White Paper is concerned, among 
other things, with working out ways to make application of  ‘contracts of  agreed objectives 
between the Union, represented by the Commission, and the authorities with a regulatory or 
management capability’ (note the terminology).
Christian Joerges argues, more generally, that it is not surprising that the real-life practices 
of  European government can best be grasped with the concept of  ‘governance’;  he even 
37 David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 726.
38 I leave aside here complications of  the type discussed for example by Harvey S. James Jr., who 
“contends that there is an important distinction between governance structure and contractual form”. 
The relevant point, according to James, is that “governance refers to the general environments and 
instruments that structure and ‘govern’ specific terms of  trade negotiated in ‘contracts’”. But this 
complication  is  not  pertinent  to  the  present  argument.  James,  “Separating  Contract  from 
Governance”, Managerial and Decision Economics, 21, 2000.
39 Grahame Lock, Oikoumenes promachoi, Inaugural lecture, Leiden, 2003.
40 Supiot, “La contractualisation de la société”, Le Courrier de l’environnement, no. 43, May 2001.
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quotes Joseph Weiler’s words about the ‘underworld’ of  the European governance system.... 
The policy vocabulary is nowadays rich with new conceptual combinations.”41
But all these combinations depend on one or another mixture of  contractual and business 
or managerial categories. They all aim at a privatization of  the State. And this is the essence of 
the governance idea, whether in the variety of  “good governance”, of  so-called “democratic 
governance”,  of  “global  governance”,  of  “decentralized  governance”,  of  “associative 
governance”, of  “participatory governance” or whatever. Thus  René de Schutter writes: the 
concept of  governance is in any case “linked to the objectives of  business administration and 
is oriented to performance”.42 In the view of  the World Bank, indeed, “democracy and the 
market  go together,  given that  the democratic State is  a ‘light’  State which functions in a 
symbiotic relation with the State, and no longer an interventionist State”, so that “governance, 
a fuzzy concept indicating that the management of  public affairs should no longer be confused 
with  the  power  of  the  State  alone,  becomes  a  new  condition  of  [structural  economic] 
adjustment.”43
To look at  the  matter  in  quite  another  light,  however,  we  might  say  –  with  Frédéric 
Debuyst  –  that  the  notion  of  governance  now being  peddled  by  the  dominant  political 
thinking “is a response to the needs of  a policy of  control over the world, or … a reaction to 
the imperative requirements of  neo-liberal globalization”. Thus its essential principles are:
• a tendency to the subordination of  the existing nation States to transnational 
economic agents, who are striving to impose their logic and their model of 
good management;
• the imposition, mainly by the well-known international agencies (IMF, World 
Bank etc.), of  conditions for the grant of  financial aid to the Third World and 
Eastern Europe, especially rules of  structural adjustment, as well as political 
conditions; and
• the  requirement  that  certain  large-scale  social  programmes  should  be 
“decentralized”, that is, entrusted to organizations of  “civil society”.44
A European Commission Staff  Working Document insists that the European Union is all 
about “involving” regional, local and non-governmental actors in “devising and implementing 
decisions”  –  it  is  about  “accountability”  to  “stakeholders”.  Thus  it  is  clear,  claims  the 
document,  that  “the  reform  of  European  modes  of  governance  is  all  about  improving 
democracy in Europe”. 45 Or is it perhaps just the opposite?
But governance, as we saw, is not only a European project.  Many similar texts can be 
found,  issuing  from  countless  governmental,  non-governmental  and  private  sector 
organizations. All this literature on governance, Debuyst argues, is “bedecked with terms which 
create the illusion of  a democratic and caring vision of  the world…”
What might be the future of  this illusion?46
41 Lock, op. cit.; Joerges,  ARENA Conference on Democracy and European Governance: Theory 
and  Practice  in  the  Debate  on  the  Future  of  Europe,  Oslo,  March 4-5  2002,  Badia  Fiesolana: 
European University Institute, 2002.
42 See René de Schutter, “De la gouvernance dans tous ses sens”, in Gresea Echos, no. 39, 2003.
43 Quoted by Schutter, op. cit.
44 Debuyst, “Outil alibi ou contre pouvoir?”, in Gresea Echos, no. 39, 2003.
45 “Enhancing democracy in the European Union”, Brussels, 11 October 2000, p. 4.
46 The production of  this paper was facilitated by a grant from the NWO (Dutch Organization for 
Scientific Research), no. 450-04-003: “Origin, significance and consequences of  a major institutional 
shift: The rise of  ‘neo-contractualism’, with special attention to Europe”.
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